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PANEL ONE
MCCAIN-FEINGOLD: PRESENT AND FUTURE+
DIANA NOBILE, LEAD ARTICLES EDITOR, CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW: I'm proud to introduce our first panel, which will focus on the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002-McCain-Feingold. Our first
panelist is Laura MacCleery, a Deputy Director at the Brennan Center for
Justice at the New York University School of Law.
Our second panelist is Mr. William McGinley, of counsel at Patton Boggs.
Mr. McGinley advises federal and state candidates, political party committees,
political action committees, donors, political vendors, and grassroots lobbying
and issue advocacy organizations regarding accounting, finance, tax, corporate,
ethics, and broadcasting finance issues.
It is my pleasure to introduce our moderator, Marshall J. Breger, Professor
of Law here at The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
At this time I would like to turn the discussion over to Professor Breger.
PROF. BREGER: Well, thank you. Our plan is that each of the speakers
offers a fifteen-minute summary of the paper they prepared for the Law
Review Symposium. Then I am going to ask some questions and then
hopefully you, the audience, will join in. Our first speaker is Ms. Laura
MacCleery.
MS. MACCLEERY: Well, thank you so much Professor Breger, Dean
[Stacy] Brustin, Reverend [Raymond] O'Brien, and Diana [Nobile] and David
[Schumacher] for putting together this panel. It was terrific to hear the keynote
of Mr. Baran, which really teed up a lot of the issues that we will cover here.
I've worked in the Brennan Center for a little more than a year, and I love
talking to students because I really enjoy having a career in nonprofit advocacy
work. Before working at the Brennan Center, I worked for eight years in
another nonprofit consumer advocacy organization, Public Citizen, and I think
working on issues of such difficulty as campaign finance-whatever your
perspective on the issues-or other issues of constitutional complexity, is an
incredibly rewarding way to have a legal career. Whether you do it in a firm or
at a nonprofit or advocacy group, I always recommend to students that they
think deeply about the jobs that they will pursue after law school and follow
+ The text appears substantially as it was transcribed on January 23, 2009 at The Catholic
University of America, Columbus School of Law. The views and opinions expressed herein are
those of the panelists, and do not necessarily represent the views and opinions of the Catholic
University Law Review; The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; or any
organization with which the panelists are affiliated. William McGinley's comments constitute his
personal views on the topics discussed and not those of any client, or any other individual or
organization. Mr. McGinley participated in the Symposium panel in his personal capacity and
not on behalf of any client.
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their heart because it can be incredibly interesting to be able to do this kind of
work.
I'll next make some general remarks about why I believe in campaign
finance reform. Because oftentimes the constitutional concepts are so abstract,
the advocates can talk past each other. The work that I did at the consumer
advocacy group Public Citizen concerned a lot of different issues, but one of
the issues that I worked on was improving vehicle fuel economy. For years we
tried to get Congress to better regulate the fuel economy of vehicles on the
road. We tried for more than a decade. There were bills that came up every
congressional session. The auto industry employed over a million people;
millions more jobs depended on it and so it had an enormous amount of impact
even without campaign contributions. But with the addition of campaign
contributions, it seemed impossible to get anyone to take the long view, and
there were consequences associated with this. Not the least of which was the
lack of competitiveness for the domestic industry. There were laws on the
books that were supposed to require improvements in fuel economy year in
[and] year out, and yet there were none. It is from this experience-looking at
this distortion of public policy and how Congress really cannot serve the public
interests-that I came to believe in campaign finance reform. The conundrum
of a democracy is really the tension of how you deal with the incredible
concentration of capital that comes about in the context of a democracy-how
you grapple with the economic power exercised by those interests-and assure
that the people who are making the long-term and hard decisions are doing so
from a genuine public policy perspective, are doing so having faced the music,
as it were, both politically and as to policy matters.
So I came to this work, I came to [campaign] finance with that kind of
legislative advocacy [background], and with this frustration about seeing bad
decisions get made or good decisions not get made. The decisions, such as the
one on fuel economy, got delayed, and delayed, and delayed until looking at
the headlines last fall, it's almost too late to fix what should have been fixed
ten years ago when the economy was good, and when there was money to
spare.
My paper is a close look at the organizing efforts and financial incentives
and their relationship to the monetary incentives provided in campaign finance
reform and the law. It is called Goodbye Soft Money, Hello Grassroots and in
it, I argue that when the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act or BCRA or
McCain-Feingold-it's known by both of those short names-was enacted, it
exacerbated and accelerated an existing background trend where the parties
and the candidates were moving away from these huge pots of soft money,
given by corporations or unions or individuals in some cases, and moving more
toward small donor and individual contributions.
When you combine that with the low incremental cost for contributions that
can be yet gleaned through the Internet as a development in technology, BCRA
both laid the groundwork and took away the incentives for the parties to keep
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seeking soft money donations. And it pushed the parties into a much more
grassroots-based operation, which was how they campaigned before, and yet
had moved away from in the nineties, with both parties competing for
essentially the same soft money dollars and the corporations. Many of these
corporations were part of the push to enact BCRA, because the soft money
contributions had essentially become a kind of baksheesh. The corporations
recognized they would have to give not only because they wanted to make sure
that their agenda was heard, but because they were scared of what would
happen if they didn't give-that they'd be locked out of the room because the
next guy, their corporate competitor, would be sure to participate.
So there was this kind of imperative that corporations cough up soft money
and, after BCRA came into play, there was some money that went into
independent expenditure groups and where there was additional spending, but
by and large what studies have shown is that when the incentives went away
for the corporations to give the soft money, they got out of the soft money
game and that most corporations got out and stayed out.
As the political parties were so dependent on soft money, it was predicted
that they would suffer greatly. Mr. Baran's keynote address made a point that
it was sort of cynical that the Democrats in Congress voted for BCRA,
overwhelmingly pushed the law, because they thought it would help
incumbents, and Mr. Baran named a number of ways in which he thought it
would advantage incumbents. But I can show you-I brought this article
[panelist presents exhibits to audience] because it's usually a good exhibit-
there was a prevailing view at the time which was that BCRA was, in a phrase,
"the Democratic Party suicide bill." Everybody bought into it-because the
Democrats' dependence on soft money was such that it was believed that
BCRA would actually hurt them considerably.
Instead it has turned out that they replaced all of the soft money that they
used to gather, and more, with hard money-with regulated money in
increments from individuals. In order to do that, they've had to change the
way that they solicited contributions. It became a much more grassroots
enterprise.
This shift really was quite powerful. Also, BCRA increased the individual
contribution limits from $1000 to $2000, which was another incentive-an
additional incentive if you will-to go out and invest in a grassroots network
which I think has transformed the financial electoral process and led to a much
more exciting election in 2008. This was something that felt very different-
and bottom up instead of top down-in terms of which donors were important
to the candidates, and who mattered on both sides in terms of the parties and
the presidential election. So that's the thesis of the paper, and I'll just point out
that one of the things that the McConnell Court, when it reviewed the
constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, said was that it
wasn't only that there was an interest in preventing .corruption. It recognized
that there is an interest in having robust public information about who is
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seeking to influence campaigns and that there are "competing constitutional
values"--including an interest in fair, informed, and participatory democratic
decision-making. That's the kind of robust interest that we are excited about
when we look at the small donor revolution and when we look at the changes
that BCRA has brought about.
MR. MCGINLEY: My name is Bill McGinley and I'm of counsel with the
law firm of Patton Boggs LLP, and as was stated in the introduction, my
practice area largely focuses on party committees, candidates, political action
committees, and grassroots lobbying groups.
One of the things that I'm going to try to focus on today with respect to
McCain-Feingold--or I will also refer to it as BCRA-is the myth versus the
reality; and if we're going to talk about the past, the present, and the future of
this law, I think we need to have a baseline understanding of the impetus that
brought about the law-some of the realities of the political participants that
existed immediately prior to the enactment of this law. Primarily, I would like
to focus on the political parties today. A lot has been made by the reform
community that the national party committees were raising large sums of
money and that they were getting corporations and wealthy individuals to
make large donations to the national party committees. One of the things that
you need to bear in mind is that the people at the Republican National
Committee made substantial investments in their low-dollar donor program,
and this was not only going to be done through fundraising events, but it was
also done through its direct-mail program. So if you look at the average
donation to some of these national party committees, the average donation was
quite small, because of the size of the small-dollar donor base that they had
developed over the years by making the substantial investments. These were
individuals who contributed small-dollar amounts similar to those received by
the Obama campaign-$25 donations, $50 donations, $100 donations, $200
donations, and these monies were spent on federal campaign activities.
What also happened at the national party committees-and this was true at
the DNC and the RNC-was that they were maintaining not only the federal
account that was fully regulated by the FEC, but they were also maintaining
accounts that permitted these national party committees to participate in state
elections across the nation. These were monies that were regulated by the
applicable state law-contribution limits, disclosure requirements, and some of
the other requirements that go into the campaign finance regime. These
national party committees were maintaining twenty-five, fifty accounts where
they had to basically deposit these monies into different state accounts that
were disclosed to the state election agency so that the national party
committees could support the local candidates and the state candidates. Under
many state regimes, the federal money was not recognized. There were many
instances where, because the federal money was reported to the FEC and it
wasn't reported to the state agency, they weren't eligible to use it in the state.
Are there some states that permitted unlimited donations? Yes. Were the
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national party committees accepting some larger donations? Were they able to
use those donations to pay the nonfederal share of their allocable expenses,
such as building expenses, staff, and other overhead expenses? Yes.
And something else that came out of the FEC was an advisory opinion
regarding issue advocacy advertisements sponsored by party committees-
communications that did not expressly advocate the election or defeat of a
candidate. The ads didn't say vote for, vote against, support, oppose, etc., the
specific candidate, but as we saw during the Clinton years, there were large,
robust debates between the party committees on issues of importance of the
day.
We all remember the government shutdown. We remember the deficit. We
remember some of the other issues that the parties were debating at the time
and you saw the Democratic National Committee running advertisements on
the split, without advocating the election or defeat, that were paid for with a
mixture of both hard money and soft money. And the theory behind this, from
the FEC advisory opinion, is that these types of advertisements-these types of
policy advertisements-that discuss important issues of the day impact races
up and down the ticket. They can affect anything from dogcatcher to state
legislator, to governor, member of the House, member of the Senate, President
of the United States.
And that sometimes the policy tone that is set in the federal government
bleeds down into the states. If you remember through the Clinton years,
federalism was a big question. What is the ability of the federal government to
impose unfunded mandates on the states? Congress passed a bill saying the
states were required to do this but they didn't allocate the funding for them.
And soon, some of these issues were great policy debates between the two
political parties-but particularly during the 1996 election. So what
happened? Basically, what happened was that the national party committees
were running these advertisements and, as Mr. Baran pointed out in his
keynote address, incumbents don't like to be criticized. Laura [MacCleery]
just mentioned that one of the things that the reform community is looking for,
and I think we all agree on this point, is that incumbents need to be held
accountable for their decisions. That the citizenry and all the interested
parties-the stakeholders in the debate-have the opportunity to express their
views. When the incumbents make the decision to pursue a policy that means
that the party committees, the grassroots lobbying groups, citizen groups,
consumer advocacy groups, and the rest of the stakeholders get to hold [the
incumbents] accountable for their decision. They get to praise the decision.
They get to criticize the decision. They get to say, "Here is where you need to
tweak this policy at the edges." What happened with these advertisements is
that the incumbents didn't like them. There were a number of incumbents who
were heavily criticized.
I'll never forget one of the DNC advertisements that was showing, basically
criticizing, then-Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, who was going to be the
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Republican nominee for president, and then-Speaker [Newt] Gingrich. And if
you remember, there was the budget shutdown and the DNC runs this
advertisement showing Senator Dole and Speaker Gingrich in grainy black and
white footage-they're just the evildoers that are conspiring to shutdown the
government. Cutaway to President [Bill] Clinton and Vice President [AI] Gore
in the Oval Office and all of a sudden it's like something out of a fairytale.
There are birds chirping in the trees outside the window, full-light color film
and, basically, what some of the critics were saying was that this was an unfair
attack. That this was an advertisement that was designed ... to do nothing
more than to diminish support for Senator Dole's candidacy and increase
support for President Clinton's re-election candidacy.
During the audit of these presidential campaigns-and this was one impetus
for BCRA-there was huge debate about this because the campaigns at that
time were taking taxpayer money for the general election. There was a
mandatory audit. The auditors go in and they examine both campaigns and
then they take a look at the national party committees because the committees
have a certain amount that they can spend on their candidates. But the auditors
also examined the issue advocacy advertisements sponsored by the national
committees. The RNC ran issue ads. The DNC ran issue ads. There was an
advisory opinion from the FEC that said this was permissible, but the reform
community and some members of the Commission just didn't like it. And so
they started using what I like to call a scratch, sniff, feel test to determine if the
ads were appropriate. If it looks like a campaign ad, it kind of feels like a
campaign ad, and it probably has some type of impact on the campaign, it must
be a campaign ad, right?
Well, ultimately the FEC punted on this issue and that was from the 1996
election. Coming into 2000, we saw that the same thing was happening again
and once again we saw it in the primary field. We saw it in the general
election field and as a result of this election, in the second go-around where
party committees were discussing issues of national importance, the reformers
and those sponsors of the bill decided to put forward the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act.
So what were the basic tenets of this Act? If you take a look at what was
done in the past, BCRA basically tried to drive a wedge between political party
committees, federal candidates and officeholders, and outside groups.
All of a sudden you have strict coordination rules. Campaigns could not
discuss communications within a certain time period with their party
committees. When you have the national party committee that is basically
looking out for its candidates across the nation at all levels of government-
suddenly you're going to drive a wedge between the officeholders and the
candidates that are party adherents, people who are running on the ticket
because they're basically giving the voters shorthand information to say this is
the platform they believe in, but they can't communicate with the party about
the content of that communication, especially if a preference is made.
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The other thing that happened with BCRA is that it placed further
restrictions on the state parties and county parties-which is really where the
grassroots operate, where the rubber meets the road. It federalized a lot of
election activities that properly belong within the state election law realm.
Suddenly these state and local parties are subject to FEC jurisdiction, FEC
regulation, FEC disclosure requirements, and FEC funding restrictions on basic
campaign activities that the party committees have traditionally performed
with state dollars. It affects voter registration, for example.
The state and local party committees are also now subject to activity
restrictions on federal candidates and officeholders and their appearances at
state party fundraising events where they're raising money, not for the federal
account, but for the state account to help support the state candidates.
It affects county party events-many county parties do not have a federal
account that is regulated by the FEC where they can engage in federal election
activity. Federal officeholders are reluctant to show up at county party events
where they're raising money, because of the soft money ban. Even though
BCRA does provide some technical guidance that permits them to do it, a lot
of people just stayed away.
It affects outside groups. You have outside groups that are lobbying the
Hill-and the second panel will get into the constitutionality of petitioning the
government-but you also have outside groups that also want to make their
case directly to the people. And they sponsor ads regarding legislation of
particular importance. So, suddenly, they're facing all sorts of campaign
finance restrictions. Congress sometimes meets during the time period
immediately after an election. How many times have we seen that Congress is
in session immediately preceding an election? When are people most likely to
pay attention to the important issues of the day? Right before the election.
They're examining candidate positions on issues. They're examining
candidate qualifications on issues. But they're also paying attention to what's
happening in Washington, D.C. And the people that they're voting on are
about to come into session-the incumbent members are about to vote on some
of these important issues.
For example, one of the issues may be about bailout legislation-so what is
the tension there? When a group wants to say: "Wait a minute, you're about to
regulate an activity, or you're about to prohibit an activity, or you're about to
go laissez-faire on an activity, and we don't think that's right." And the group
identifies an officeholder who supports that position and they believe the
public should call and tell the officeholder how they feel about this. Suddenly,
under the Electioneering Communication ban-which some people call the
blackout period-you couldn't do that. And so there are a number of issues in
the present. I believe the present is a transition period. BCRA has been in
existence now for a couple of cycles, and groups and individuals are beginning
to feel the effect of the law.
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We're seeing a number of cases that have worked their way through the
courts, whether it's the electioneering communication case-Wisconsin Right
to Life-or if it's the Millionaire's Amendment issue in the Davis case. But
there are also some other current cases such as the RNC lawsuit challenging
the national party soft money ban. The RNC has said: "We want them to do
the state elections again with state regulated funds. We want to be able to use
state permissible money in the same way that unions can, in the same way the
corporations can, and the same way that coalitions of state officeholders can.
We think we have that right."
The RNC also wants to go after the coordinated expenditure limits.
Coordinated expenditure limits are basically the money that a political party
can spend on behalf of its nominee-they get X number of dollars and it can be
spent on anything from electrical bills, to office rent, to advertisements. These
funds are spent in full coordination with the federal candidate and are
permissible expenditures, regulated by the FEC and reported to the FEC.
What do I think the future is? I think the future under BCRA is going to
decentralize the political marketplace unless something happens. Back in the
1970s, a professor wrote a great article-and I'm sorry I can't remember the
name of the title-but he talked about the value of the political parties and how
the political parties have a moderating influence on political discourse.
National party committees are made up of all sorts of factions that represent
different types of constituencies. These coalitions are regional in some
cases-whether it's the coalitions in the northeast versus the coalitions in the
south versus the coalitions in the midwest versus the coalitions out west.
Different issues, different priorities, but they all make up the coalitions that
make up the political party committee.
And he talked about how the parties have a moderating influence on political
discourse, and that the greatest threat for corruption is the single-interest
interest groups. One of the effects of McCain-Feingold is that it's taking the
money out of the party committee system and giving it to the single-interest
interest groups. And so you'll see more ads on targeting someone on a single
issue. For example, take the case of "McGinleys For Life"-and this
organization will run advertisements supporting or opposing the positions of
officeholders or candidates by talking about pro-life, or pro-abortion, or pro-
choice issues.
It's a single issue. They don't care about anything else and they are going to
drive it home. And the people that they talk to about this are the people who
are going to exert influence on that particular issue, as opposed to a political
party committee that needs to look to the positions of multiple candidates in
the northeast, in the west. Are they any different than the positions of the
candidates in the south and the midwest? What I think what we're going to see
is that the political power and the money will continue to decentralize away
from the political parties in favor of these single-interest groups, not to
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mention the rise of the blogosphere and some of the other technologies that are
coming about, the social networking sites, etc.
I think that the political parties have a real challenge and I believe that one
of the issues that the legislature and the courts need to consider is: Do we want
to continue to be a two-party system? Or do we want to be balkanized into
single-interest groups where people and groups are operating more on the
extreme and are not subject to the moderating influence of the parties?
PROF. BREGER: Thank you very much. I think it's clear that our
conversation is touching on three themes: constitutional issues, statutory issues
about BCRA mechanisms of compliance (so how do I allocate this money? Is
it hard? Is it soft? Is it state? Is it federal and if I'm stuck because I have too
much federal, can I somehow reallocate it to state and then use it?), and then
the empirical reality of campaign finance. And while our conversation has
moved from one issue to the other; we need to keep all three in mind. I am
going to start with a couple of questions for Ms. MacCleery, and then I hope
Mr. McGinley will comment.
I was struck by your focus on small donors, and the suggestion that between
the Internet and the small donor we have solved the problem of big money
politics. I wonder if it's really true. Michael Malbin, as I think you know, has
pointed out that the percentage of small donors for Obama was the same
percentage as the small Bush donors in 2004.
So while the amounts are different this time around, the percentages are the
same; and I suppose there is an argument that you need an irreducible
minimum to fund a campaign. So if you can get that irreducible minimum by
small donations you don't need the big donations. But if the irreducible
minimum has grown to $750 million, you may still need those big donors. So I
wonder if the game has really changed.
And also I wonder what kind of regulation you think is needed for small
donors. There was a concern about foreign contributions slipping in under the
small donor "radar screen" because under a certain amount of money the small
donors do not have to be identified or can easily be misidentified.
And then thirdly, I asked you to talk a bit about the role of big donors in
your small donor utopia. Certainly the Obama campaign benefited from big
donors, and benefited as well from an often separate group-bundlers.
Because if you have a campaign contributor-a hard money donor, so to
speak-you often need a different class of persons either who bundle the hard
money contributions or who can be recruited to raise and bundle hard money.
Not every rich person has friends he or she can call upon.
Several functional purposes are served by grassroots small-donor
recruiting-getting money from people who the campaign wouldn't otherwise
be able to reach. Nonetheless, it is worth asking whether we are getting too
overexcited about the possibility of small donors changing the world of
politics.
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MS. MACCLEERY: I think that is one of the key questions right now in
campaign finance, and, looking at the future, I think it's one of the key issues
about the 2008 election. Of course, one of the things that hampers our analysis
at this particular moment is that the campaign finance data that are available
haven't been thoroughly cleaned and processed.
So we're waiting for groups like the Campaign Finance Institute to tell us
about the presidential election numbers. Although all the excitement was at
the presidential level, other questions are what did we see in congressional
elections, and in state elections. There are a lot of good questions to be asked
about the extent of these changes.
This is one of the things that is so exciting to reformers about this-Mr.
Baran talked about this pretty famous quote about the relationship between
money and speech and this analogy of a tank of gasoline, which suggests that
you need a tank of gasoline to go down the road and that in just the same way,
money facilitates speech.
But that linear relationship--the idea that one tank of gas gets you so far-is
really transformed by the Internet. There's very few, if any, costs associated
with communicating to more people with this technology.
You really do start to push on this notion of how much-how closely
connected is that relationship between money and speech and is it going to stay
that way into the future? Are we really saying that communication costs will
stay the same? We know that, in the 2008 election, a substantial amount of
money was collected for the use in broadcast advertisement-and certainly
we're not looking at the end of television advertising.
So I don't want to overstate it, but these developments do trouble this notion
of an easy equivalence between money and speech. I also want to discuss the
available numbers on contributions. Everybody in the reform community got
really excited, and I think you saw this in the press over the course of the
election by the high percentages of small donors, that is donors under $200,
who I would really call micro-donors.
Those are people who are donating very incremental amounts. Those were
in the fifty to sixty percentile. Then, when Campaign Finance Institute took a
hard look at the numbers after the close of the election in late November, what
they found was there were a lot of people who ended up bumping themselves
over that $200 mark as they gave $30 and then $20. It was very easy to go
from a micro-donor level, to one above the level at which people had
traditionally been recognized as a small donor. So when they went to crunch
the numbers they found, surprisingly, that the actual percentage of people who
were not repeaters-those who had just given $200 or less in the Obama
campaign-was twenty-six percent and when this was compared to President
Bush in 2004, his small donors were twenty-five percent.
So what happened to the small donor revolution? Well, one answer is that
twenty-five percent of $400 million is a lot bigger of a number than twenty-six
percent of $150 or $160 million. So if you look at the absolute numbers you
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do see that there has been a substantial increase in new donors and small
donors. Many new donors were the micro-donors brought into the campaign
finance universe for the first time. One of the things that has been troubling
about campaign finance over the years has been that there is only a tiny
percentage of the population that actually gives any money at all to the
candidates. And so the idea that you're changing habits-that you're actually
getting new people to get engaged-is something quite significant. It's also
much easier to go back to somebody who has already written a check once and
get more money from that person than it is to get somebody new.
The other thing that happened in the campaign-and again this was a
bipartisan development across the different campaign organizations-was that
the donation function became integrated into a much more meaningful
structure for organizing in the campaign generally. They developed all of
these Internet tools. I'm familiar with the Obama campaign's, which had the
neighbor-to-neighbor tool in which people could volunteer time and call
neighbors in other states and I think it was a similar consolidation...
PROF. BREGER: Excuse me, if they are neighbors are they really to be
found in "other" states?
MS. MACCLEERY: Well "neighbors." However fictional the construction
of calling people, the volunteers were assigned neighboring states in the
database. So they were doing sort of person-to-person, human-to-human
contact and recruitment at a level that they rarely could have achieved in
previous elections without this organizing and database technology.
It may also work in actual neighborhoods. Volunteers could have gone and
knocked on doors, but obviously people are going to be less inclined to do that
in the cold and the rain than they will be to sit in their living room and make
phone calls. And the manner in which these sort of volunteering functions
were coordinated-as part of the donor outreach strategy-enabled the Obama
campaign to end up with a presidential winner who had an email list of 13
million names.
No one has ever come into political office in the United States with that sort
of grassroots network at their back. It's going to have impact, and they intend
to use it for political organizing in a manner that will last long past election
day-which means that the campaign finance piece is essentially an integrated
piece of an overall system of political engagement. That is what is so
interesting and exciting about the small donor revolution, and it means
essentially a more bottom up politics in exactly the way that reformers have
always valued.
Now, what's the role of large contributions? That was the other and last part
of your question.
PROF. BREGER: I was referring to the legal problems of the Internet and
small-donor donations.
MR. MCGINLEY: I believe there were some issues with contributions
collected over the Internet. Some campaigns from last cycle could have done a
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better job of vetting the small donations to determine their source. And if a
presidential public funding bill is written and when other campaign finance
bills move through the Congress-and I'm sure the FEC will take a look at this
as well-there will probably be more specific regulation of this area, so that
you do have to have some kind of verification like a street address. When
you're shopping on the Internet, you can validate your credit card-I think we
can prompt the whole system to do the same thing with donors. A check on
foreign donors has to be instigated from the very first day by the campaigns.
They should implement that. I think those...
PROF. BREGER: I just wonder about people making fraudulent donations.
MS. MACCLEERY: You're right. We should have an existing legal
responsibility to be checking for fraudulent donations and they need to be very
vigilant about that, and there needs to be enforcement and a structure that
reinforces that. I think that's a problem with the trend of BCRA in terms of the
overall scope of what could be accomplished.
In terms of the role of large donors and bundlers, they were an incredibly
prevalent force in this campaign. They were a major part of President
Obama's campaign fundraising. I'm looking at the two accompanying
numbers here. The ultra large donors still are able, under aggregated
contribution limits, even after McCain-Feingold--don't believe the hype-to
give over $100,000 into different party accounts.
So when people talk about regulated money-how they cut off money-
well, the parties are doing fine. They've been able to collect plenty of money
in the wake of McCain-Feingold and in fact this cycle did not-even at the
state level-see any diminution in their fundraising.
The county parties that Mr. McGinley mentioned are really only a drop in
the bucket in terms of overall money. They're about one percent national
fundraising for the campaigns. It's true that the large donors remain a big part
of fundraising. What do you do about that?
Our big idea is to establish public funding systems to reinvigorate the
presidential public funding system and fix it so it actually works in time for the
next presidential election, and to establish a public funding system for
congressional candidates. This public funding system would essentially
reinforce and lift up small donors. Any candidate could voluntarily decide
whether or not to participate.
A participating candidate would have to collect a certain number of
qualifying contributions-to show that they are supported by their local
community, and that they're serious about their intentions to run. For the
candidate, it's a significant number of contributions that they would have to
collect-micro donations between $5 and $100 or $5 and $200, depending on
the model.
Once a candidate has accumulated a certain amount, they could then qualify
for grants of a certain amount of funds to enable them to run a campaign. They
would also be eligible for matching funds for small donations. So candidates
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could continue collecting money, and at some point they would stop getting the
public matching funds, but could still keep collecting the small donations.
That kind of structure essentially supports small donor activity and
eliminates the ability of candidates to keep collecting large contributions,
which would force candidates to really go in the direction of all of the
background trends toward small donors. They would have to become adept
and confident in their use of the grassroots donors.
No single person or interest would determine their campaign money or
political survival, which is our goal. I don't think it's too idealistic, given that
we have well-functioning public funding systems in several states today: in
Arizona, in Maine, in Connecticut, and in North Carolina's judicial elections.
These systems work incredibly well. The system in Connecticut had eighty
percent participation in this last election cycle, its first election cycle. It also
had bipartisan participation-Republicans and Democrats, grassroots
candidates, some younger candidates, a more diverse candidate group in terms
of race, gender, and socioeconomic backgrounds.
In Maine, for example, a single mom and a waitress got elected using public
funding and now she's in the state assembly. So you have this record of state
level success where the states have used similar models of public funding and
we really want to see the same accomplished for Congress.
PROF. BREGER: One quick follow-up before I hand the microphone over
to Mr. McGinley. I think our present experience with public financing at the
national level has not been as ecstatic as you suggested. In fact, it is my
understanding that if Mr. Obama had not opted out of a government-financed
campaign, the one dollar check off from taxpayers may not have been enough
to actually pay for the public financing obligation. So why do you think it will
be different in the future?
MS. MACCLEERY: The funding mechanism is always the question. I think
the program should be funded as kind of a form of public good from the
treasury, which is consistent with my perspective that this would yield lots of
bargains for our public policy-in terms of its impact on reducing earmarks
and the corporate subsidies that we would avoid making. But the funding
mechanism aside, the structure of the current presidential pubic financing
system is in shambles. It was a program enacted in the 1970s after Watergate.
It hasn't been meaningfully updated since. It really needs to be brought up to
modem standards, and there is interest in doing that. We'll see how these
efforts move forward, but there's a commitment on the part of our community
to try to fix the program and to keep something that had worked so well. Also,
in terms of competition, the historical incumbency rate in presidential elections
since the program began is actually a lot lower than it is in congressional races.
The presidential system is essential, because it allows candidates to face
even sitting presidents on a much more even plane. So I think it had a lot of
good effects over the years, and it's a shame that it has been essentially
neglected by Congress in terms of modernizing it.
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PROF. BREGER: So what we have been engaged in is a discussion of small
donors, hard money, big money, and public financing. Mr. McGinley, the
floor is yours.
MR. MCGINLEY: Thank you. There are a couple of comments that I just
wish to make first-what we see cycle after cycle is that each one has a
breakthrough technology. At some point, the TV was a breakthrough
technology. At the time, it was unbelievable that campaigns ran political ads
on television-radio being in the same boat at one point.
But in 2006, the big breakthrough was YouTube. We saw outside groups,
local committees, bloggers, candidates, and everybody else trailing their
opponent with a camera. Every time someone made a mistake, which all
candidates do, it immediately was posted on YouTube.
Anytime somebody saw something scandalous or something that they
wanted to communicate, YouTube was the vehicle for disseminating
information. This election cycle, what we really saw was the greater emphasis
on the e-mail solicitations, especially on the Democratic side, which carries a
lower cost per donation. But they also employed social networking sites,
where people can develop lists for free by signing up, as opposed to generating
the costs of sending out the e-mails. And so the 2008 election had its own
technological advance. What it will be in 2010? We don't know. But I'm
sure we're about to find out in about twelve months.
And so something will come to the fore as this cycle's technological
advancement. Do technological advancements reduce costs? Yes. Do they
enable a greater number of people to participate in the political process?
Absolutely. And I think we all applaud that-whether it's people expressing
their own views on YouTube, or on the social networking sites like Facebook,
or just making small donor donations to the candidates or the organizations
that they support by credit card donations over the Internet. I think we all
agree that democracy is better when it has fuller participation.
And fuller participation also happens in the money primary. You see a lot of
times in the buildup to a presidential election, they will talk about the money
primary. Who has the resources to actually compete in that eighteen month
sprint called a presidential election? Now, it's twenty-four months. Resources
are a big deal, and while the small dollar donor base-which I think we all
agree is a good thing-has increased, we still need to recognize that money
does promote speech. We've jumped on this analogy of a tank of gas. It's
basically a trip to the corner supermarket to put up a banner ad on a website.
But it's a cross country trip to run advertising on television, which is still one
of the most effective ways of communicating political views.
The other thing that we need to talk about is compliance costs. As we begin
to impose greater and greater restrictions-including greater and greater
disclosure requirements--on not only the campaigns and party committees, but
also outside groups who want to communicate their views about federal
officeholders, candidates, and their positions, compliance costs go up.
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And so one of the issues that we need to be thinking about is how we make
their life a little bit easier. What you will find, and what most practitioners will
tell you, is that the overwhelming majority of the political participants-
whether it's a candidate, party, committee, or an outside group that runs
advertisements-do their best to comply with the law.
One of the things that has happened with this increased regulation coupled
with an increase in the penalties is that the pro-regulation groups file generic
complaints with the FEC and DOJ. These groups send a preemptive letter to
the DOJ and the FEC saying, "We expect you to police these people; these
groups may want to exercise their First Amendment rights, but we think they
have a corrupting influence on the process and we expect you to hold them
accountable"-even though these folks are trying to comply.
One of the things that it has done is driven volunteers from the process.
When you look at campaigns, when you look at party committees, when you
look at people banding together to communicate their views, very rarely do
you see the full volunteer effort-now you need to go out and get the band of
professionals. You've got to hire the lawyers, which I love. You've got to
hire the accountants, which the accountants love.
However, we do see one aspect where volunteering is increasing and Laura
[MacCleery] identified it, talking about how campaigns are trying to utilize
volunteers as opposed to paid individuals to register people or to get-out-the-
vote on a particular candidate or issue. The reason for that is simple-these
guys have all looked at this and they find that neighbor-to-neighbor
communication is effective. If I'm calling a guy that lives up the street to say:
"Hey, what are you doing? What are you doing on election day? Make sure
you vote for my candidate." That's going to be a more effective
communication than if I called a guy in Iowa, who I've never met before, and
he looks at the caller ID and says, "Who the heck is this calling from
[Washington,] D.C.?" It's going to be a much more effective communication.
So we're going to be looking at increased volunteer activities on the
organizing side, but the compliance side costs are going to continue to go
through the roof as long as we continue down this path.
Are party committees doing fine? I think that is a relevant question.
National party committees: have they raised a lot of money? You bet they
have. But pre-McCain-Feingold party committees had different buckets for
different types of funds and activities. They had their federal bucket for their
federal activity. They had the overhead, or allocation, accounts for the
overhead; and they had the state accounts for all the activities in the different
states. They helped the dogcatcher--or the guy who was running for
dogcatcher-state legislatures, governors, etc. Now, under McCain-Feingold,
they're using the same bucket.
So while we're looking at this-and we're concentrating on presidential
politics and congressional politics-what we're not exploring is the impact at
the local level. There's this whole undercurrent of local election activity where
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the rubber really meets the road, the small gatherings. The county party
committees are really where the neighbors are organizing themselves to
support a party committee, a particular party, and also to support the party's
candidate at the local level. We're not looking at the impact on them.
County parties are some of the most important party committees in the two-
party structure. They are where the people who want to volunteer their time
show up. They're not knocking down the door at the DNC or the RNC.
They're going down the street to the county party, and the county parties are
ready. These people get together, and they want to support the state and local
candidates, and they raise permissible money under the state law, and they ask
the volunteers to help with compliance matters and file their reports. Then
comes the presidential year and a bunch of the county parties, with no federal
account, want to get together and place a newspaper advertisement saying that
they love President Obama. Because it's a party committee, they have to use
all FEC money. They've got to satisfy all the compliance requirements-
including establishing the account, scrubbing the money, vetting the donors,
reporting, making sure that they comply with the disclaimer requirements. The
county parties are not engaging in this type of activity because the compliance
burdens are too high. They're not running the ad that references a federal
candidate because of the compliance costs, number one, and they don't
understand this stuff, number two. They're also on a shoestring budget
because it's an all volunteer effort-they're just not doing it. They've just
given up at the local level. And so, while I think it's easy for everybody to
focus on the presidential level, I think we need to remember the farm teams at
the state and local levels. That is where the future leaders of America are
coming from.
I'm not a business guy, but my MBA buddy tells me that when running a
business-imagine a large law firm-you've got to keep the ranks filled. If
you eliminate one year of associates, then that gap exists as they move up
through the ranks to the partnership. What we're beginning to see-and I hope
to see some data and have someone look at this-and what I can tell you from
personal experience with county party committees, both Democratic and
Republican, is that they're not engaging in federal activities at the local levels.
The concern is that the get-out-the-vote operations are all federalized. You
want to put out a communication that says vote Democratic, vote
Republican-it has to be paid for with federal money, FEC money. The
county parties can't do -that. You want to go out and register people within a
certain timeframe, you can't do that. You want to make calls to your
neighbors to develop a list so that we know who to contact to say get out and
vote. It has to be done a certain way. We just want to run a newspaper
advertisement that says we support Senator Obama for president. You can't do
it. If you don't have a federal account, you can't do it.
The county parties have suffered. If you want to look at the most numerous
categories of party committees, look to the county parties. Look to where the
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rubber meets the road. BCRA has imposed a huge cost on these organizations
and I think it's too bad.
MS. MACCLEERY: Can I respond to that?
PROF. BREGER: Very quickly, as we are "fighting the clock."
MS. MACCLEERY: I think one of the things that has been missing from the
discussion so far is an articulation of why BCRA was interested in securing
restrictions on soft money versus hard money and what the values were there.
Because when you hear about these poor counties-you wonder, how could we
have placed all these restrictions on them?
What's missing in the story are the reasons why these rules are really
important. Soft money in 2000, the major presidential election leading up to
the enactment of BCRA, was the single largest source of money for party ads.
Fifty percent of the funds that paid for the ads were soft money. You had this
enormous prevalence of essentially unregulated soft money-and when you
say soft money, how did that come about? The reason why we were-why the
reform community-was so upset about soft money was that essentially this
little loophole had been opened in which the national parties could make some
use of money that was essentially unlimited that had been given to state level
or county level parties. The idea was that they could make some use of it for
overhead-for administrative costs-yet this ballooned to fifty percent of the
money that they were spending.
Essentially, a loophole that had gone unregulated and unclosed by the FEC
had to be closed by Congress. This unlimited money was essentially
undermining the whole reason why, at the federal level, Congress had enacted
contribution limits in the first place. It doesn't matter if I am soliciting money
as a federal candidate in $1000 increments if, out of the other side of my
mouth, I can say, "By the way, give $500,000 to the state party and I will use it
any way I like."
So that's what had happened with soft money and that's why it's so
important to close down the coordination between the state or county money-
where the money is not federally regulated-and the hard money contributions
that you have to the federal parties. After enactment, all the evidence shows
that the state parties are doing fine. There absolutely has been no diminution
in their grassroots activities-so the sob stories that you're hearing are
absolutely incorrect in terms of the numbers.
PROF. BREGER: This leads up to my next question. If you worry about
loopholes-not just because they are loopholes-but because you fear that the
loopholes are undercutting the purpose of the legislation, you have to ask: what
are the purposes of McCain-Feingold? I am going to start with Mr. McGinley.
There was a suggestion, and I think you raised it at one point, that the purpose
of McCain-Feingold was to level the playing field so as to ensure real
competition among candidates. In Davis, there was a suggestion that the only
purpose for regulation is to prevent corruption. So I think we need to clarify
the purpose of campaign finance regulation. I think our purpose, Mr.
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McGinley, is not only to prevent corruption, otherwise why do we need this
FEC apparatus in the first place-why can't we just allow the criminal justice
system to prosecute violators? And if we do need to have this FEC apparatus
regulating campaign finance as you are claiming, what are the tradeoffs?
MR. MCGlNLEY: Of course, I'm just going to take a moment to respond to
one thing. National party soft money was regulated. It was regulated by the
states in which it was used. Some soft money was used for overhead costs, but
that's because the FEC determined that the overhead costs and the staffing by
political party committees was benefiting all levels: federal, state, and local.
Why did you see more soft money in the overhead? Why did you see more
soft money in the staffing and the expenses by party committees? Because it
was done according to the allocation formulas that the FEC established. The
FEC looked at the number of candidates on the ballot. They said: "How many
federal races do you have? How many state and local races do you have?" It
was called the ballot composition formula and a state party with a senate
election and a presidential election had a higher federal percentage than the
state that just had the presidential election.
States in off-years-where they didn't have a senate election-where they
just had their house races, used a larger amount of state money because they
had fewer federal offices on the ballot. So the money was allocated between
the federal account and the state account to pay for these types of expenses.
Make no mistake about it, it was regulated. It was reported to the states.
When the money was mixed, or allocated, or the state party transferred the
money from the non-federal account into the federal account to pay for
allocable expenses it was reported to the FEC. There was full sunshine on the
activity.
PROF. BREGER: Now, we come to my question.
MR. MCGINLEY: Now I'll answer your question. Purposes of BCRA-I
think the Supreme Court has been quite thorough, and I think we've seen this
in the wake of McConnell and Buckley. The sole justification for regulating
political speech with campaign financing is preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption.
Have there been a couple of outliers? Sure, the Austin case. There are a
couple of misconceptions out of McConnell. McConnell still said the only
justification for regulating political speech is preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption. McConnell was a facial challenge to the statute. It
was not an as-applied challenge. The facts were not developed. Courts are
very reluctant to overturn a statute with a facial challenge. The courts defer to
the legislature.
But now we're seeing as-applied challenges move up through the courts.
Corruption and the appearance of corruption are still the only two bases for
regulating political speech. Leveling the playing field was rejected in Davis.
When a millionaire put up his money or her money to run for federal office and
the opponent got the increased contribution level, the Court said no.
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What is also interesting about Davis is that it was challenged on a number of
grounds-First Amendment, Equal Protection and other grounds-but the
Court struck down the statute on the First Amendment grounds. The opinion
sticks to the First Amendment rationale for throwing it out and I think that's
very significant.
Look at Wisconsin Right to Life. Justice Roberts' opinion is very clear: the
only basis for regulating speech is corruption or the appearance of corruption.
We saw a lot of different rationales put forth by the FEC and the reformers.
We also saw a lot of different arguments about the advertisements that were
being run, including one of my favorites where they said that because the ad
doesn't really go after the candidate or use the magic words it's a more
effective campaign ad. In other words, the less it looks like a campaign ad, the
more effective of a campaign ad it is. To which Roberts replied, "Enough is
enough." This "heads I win, tails you lose" proposition is over.
And so what would the FEC look like if I had the opportunity to reconstruct
it? I think I would still probably have a number of commissioners from both
parties. And probably make it an equal split because the regulation of
campaign speech and activity carries with it important core values that we need
to protect. But we need to prevent violations. There are regulations that are
necessary--disclosure. We all think that we need to know where the money
comes from for campaigns. But there are a number of instances where
individuals want to speak about it and they can suffer retribution, so disclosure
doesn't work. We see that with the socialist parties requesting advisory
opinions excluding it from the disclosure requirements for fear of retribution.
I also put a premium on education. One of the things that we've seen in the
past four years is an increased emphasis from the FEC on their batting average.
How many fines are they collecting? How many people are they throwing the
book at? While at the same time, they were cutting the education budget. So
as they're ramping up the compliance requirements-for the campaigns, the
party committees, state and county groups that have federal accounts, other
people who want to just start the PACs or organize a group-they're cutting
the education budget.
I have argued that the most successful year for the FEC would be one in
which it collects no fines because everybody's in full compliance. That would
be ideal. Well over ninety percent of the people out there are trying to comply.
This stuff gets complicated quick, and it gets very onerous. Glad that we have
the Office of General Counsel? Yes, but I also would force the commission to
sit back and actually take a look at its mission, especially in light of the recent
decisions from the Supreme Court and other federal courts.
PROF. BREGER: Mr. McGinley, we're running out of time.
MR. MCGINLEY: Okay, sure. And audits would be what audits should
be-a review of money in, money out of the campaign. They should review
the finances and not get into novel legal theories. I would also use the audit
process as an education tool for the regulated community, as opposed to trying
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to refer them for an enforcement action in an effort to generate press releases.
That is not the measure of success. Total compliance should be what we aim
for, not how many people we can nail to the wall.
PROF. BREGER: Ms. MacCleery, let me try to frame the conversation:
what do you believe to be the purposes of the FEC and the purposes of
McCain-Feingold?
MS. MACCLEERY: The purpose of all campaign finance restrictions, going
back to 1907, is to address the power that money and influence have when
they're concentrated in corporations and other sources, and to reduce their
impact on the public process of government. A broader notion of corruption is
in a significant portion of the case law, and is supported by a large number of
laws that we have enacted and many cases besides McConnell. Beaumont, in
2003, says aggregated capital unduly influences politics and such influence
does not stop short of corruption.
And members of Congress often talk about the influences on them, and yet
none of them will admit, of course, that they are corrupt, but they hint at it, and
we know corruption is a real force. Look at the headlines recently. There is
massive fraud in the municipal bond market. You have [Illinois Governor
Rod] Blagojevich facing an indictment. [New Mexico Governor Bill]
Richardson is dealing with accusations of a pay-to-play scandal. We see
evidence of scandal and fraud throughout our economy and it impacts the
political officeholders most days of the week.
In Connecticut, we just won a decision in which a federal court upheld a
state pay-to-play statute, which bans lobbyists from giving political
contributions to those whom they would lobby. The court said, essentially,
that the state's history of corruption was severe and the law's infringement on
First Amendment rights was minimal because of all the other ways in which a
lobbyist may participate in the political system, that the law was perfectly
constitutional.
In terms of your second question about the FEC, I think that there is a very
confusing thicket of rules in terms of compliance, and I would take a close
look at whether or not there are clearer ways to communicate about the
compliance requirements-particularly as to disclosure regimes for the federal
political activities-to see if there is a way to simplify them for small
gatherings of volunteers. A graduated enforcement scheme would, of course,
be appropriate and is largely what is in place in practice. I also think that the
structure of the FEC is impossible in terms of enforcement, because of
common three-three splits along partisan lines. Basically, the structure has
meant that the FEC has punted on anything that has a partisan coloration or is a
difficult decision; and the FEC has been directly responsible for both the soft
money problem and for 527s either by not closing or by opening loopholes. It
has failed to regulate where we needed it most. Structurally, an administrator-
led structure could make more sense.
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PROF. BREGER: I have one last question for both of you. I have not seen
an empirical study of this but I wonder-where were the 527 ads in the last
election? Did they diminish because of ethical considerations?
The Fourth Circuit decided case law under Right to Life. The D.C. Circuit
has a speech case now before it that might take an opposite view. So where do
we start on the law of 527s? And as an empirical matter, do you think 527s
will be back and, because we are always fighting the last war when it comes to
campaign finance reform, should we be thinking now about the return of 527s?
MR. MCGINLEY: Want me to go first?
PROF. BREGER: Yes.
MR. MCGINLEY: Sure. I think one of the reasons that you didn't see
outside group activity at the presidential level was in large part because of the
experience of 2004. The FEC went after the outside groups, at the urging of
the reform groups. The reformers and the FEC pursued novel theories that
nobody believed were in place during the 2004 calendar year. For example,
the FEC adopted a rule that governed contributions, providing that money
received in response to a certain type of solicitation should be considered a
contribution under the Act. They based it upon a case that was a disclaimer
case, way back in the 1980s or 1972.
Also express advocacy-what is old is always new again. Express advocacy
is a relevant topic even today. If you remember prior to the McConnell
decision, groups filed in federal court seeking to invalidate section 100.22B,
which is the alternative definition of expressed advocacy used by the FEC.
This definition utilizes context and intent and frankly judges the ad based upon
whether the ad feels a certain way. It doesn't actually say that, but this is my
interpretation of it. It's very vague. Every federal court that has looked at it
has thrown it out. In fact, one district court tried to impose a nationwide
injunction against the FEC from enforcing it, but the FEC successfully argued
for them to pull that back. There were a couple of circuit courts that looked at
it and upheld the district court decision-throwing out the regulation. I think it
was the Second and Fourth Circuits. So, in response, the FEC adopts a policy
that says 100.22B doesn't apply in the Second and Fourth Circuits. This
means that I can say something in Virginia, but I don't get to say it out in
Colorado.
So in this legal atmosphere, here comes the FEC after the 527s and they use
the major burden test from Buckley as a basis for enforcement. Which, if you
read the Buckley opinion, was meant to limit the application of the election
laws-not expand their application to groups that may want to discuss issues,
such as candidate positions and qualifications, without expressly calling for the
election or defeat of the candidates.
In fact, the Survival Education Fund case, which the FEC based its new
contribution regulation on, said that the disclaimer was required on the
solicitation at issue in the case because the solicitation said we need to help
support and elect President Reagan. But the Court made clear, which the FEC
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never included in any of its analysis, that the Court in no way was restricting
groups from discussing the qualifications of candidates, a candidate's stance on
an issue, officeholder positions on issues, or otherwise engage what everybody
has come to understand as issue advocacy.
And so we had a vague, hodgepodge legal environment in 2004, where the
FEC basically used the discovery process to hammer people down-we see it
in the Democratic and conservative conciliation agreements. The respondents
just signed the agreements in order to end the litigation. So, in 2008,
everybody said we're just not going to go through that again.
Did you see activity down at the lower levels? Sure. Because it doesn't
draw as much attention, I suppose. But people still want to talk about it. What
is the future of this? I think in the wake of Wisconsin Right to Life, we are
going to see groups again.
I hope the SpeechNow.org case will make its way up to the Supreme
Court-I believe it has a shot. It's still working its way through the system. If
that case is successful, I would imagine that people will band together once
again to discuss the important issues.
If the Citizens United case is successful-it's pending before the Supreme
Court right now on the disclosure provision of the electioneering
communication statute that Mr. Baran talked about. The FEC said they didn't
directly address this and Citizens United is taking the issue to the Court. If you
look at Wisconsin Right to Life, I think there is a decent possibility that
Citizens United will prevail. When the Court says it's narrowing the
application of the statute that doesn't mean you don't have to comply with the
other provisions in the statute. We'll see what happens.
How do you change the definition of what is being regulated? We'll see
what happens.
PROF. BREGER: Ms. MacCleery.
MS. MACCLEERY: This issue of how much we should know about who is
spending money to influence elections is an issue that is being hotly contested
in the courts in many ways now. The SpeechNow case is ongoing, which is a
challenge to limits on uncoordinated PACs. Citizens United is another key
case. The core question on the table in many of these cases is the transparency
of the political process and how much we want to know about groups that are
spending money with the intent to influence elections, whether or not that
communication uses a "magic word," such as vote for, against, support, or
oppose. There were plenty of examples leading up to passage of BCRA of
millions of dollars in spending on so-called sham issue ads-essentially
communications that use particular words in order to avoid disclosing that
money was being spent to influence an election.
That sort of gamesmanship was exactly what Congress was trying to fix
when it enacted BCRA. The scope of that has been narrowed somewhat by the
Court's decision in Wisconsin Right to Life and the subsequent question asked
by Citizens United is: given that disclosure imposes only a minimal burden on
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First Amendment rights, should the limits on source restrictions also constrain
transparency? There is a constitutional right here, and the courts have typically
said that disclosure only receives intermediate scrutiny and is one of the least
restrictive ways that you can regulate campaign speech.
In fact, even in the Wisconsin Right to Life context, the suggestion by Mr.
Baran earlier that they just couldn't do that kind of speech or they were banned
from doing this kind of speech was, strictly speaking, inaccurate. It is actually
only the case that in order to speak they would have had to pay for it from a
separate, segregated fund and the money that may be donated into that fund is
limited. So the question then becomes: do groups want to live under certain
types of limits or do they want to escape limits and also escape transparency?
At a minimum, we think the Court in the pending Citizens United case has to
draw the line. They should say there is a broader social interest in disclosure
and transparency concerning who is trying to influence an election than there is
in terms of the interests supporting limits; that has been true in the
jurisprudence in terms of the level of scrutiny used, and this case may provide
essentially a baseline for the Court in terms of this distinction, among other
things it will also indicate where we are to go in the future with the disclosure
and other limits cases that are pending.
PROF. BREGER: Mr. McGinley.
MR. MCGINLEY: The only thing that I wanted to say was that I can
appreciate Laura [MacCleery]'s enthusiasm on the topic because obviously I
have a great deal myself on the opposite side. But it's important to remember
what the Supreme Court said is that intent and effect-basically why did you
run the ad, what is the effect of the ad-are unconstitutional considerations.
You don't get to look at that. You get to look at the four comers of the ad to
decide whether or not it's regulated. That is because somebody may say
something in 2006 that means one thing on a policy issue that is relevant at that
immediate moment, but when you look through the prism of time in 2008 you
think well, maybe they intended to influence an election. Maybe it was
discussion of the Iraq war, maybe it was a discussion of [Hurricane] Katrina,
maybe it was another discussion and so intent and effect is another issue. If
the recipient-and this is what the Roberts opinion says--of the advertisement
takes the information and decides to use it a certain way, that should not be a
liability for the speaker, otherwise the speaker is just not going to speak.
If groups are going to be subject to regulation, possible criminal prosecution,
or even civil fines, or the process penalty of investigation, they're just not
going to speak. They're going to hedge and trim and just try not to discuss it.
If you don't have clear standards, and Buckley says this, about what is
permitted and what is prohibited, then it's subject to constitutional scrutiny and
could possibly be thrown out.
In the area of political speech we need to regulate with specificity. We don't
want to be vague. We don't want to be ambiguous, so that somebody later on
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can second guess the intent and the effect of the political speech that the
speaker engaged in.
PROF. BREGER: I have to say one thing about our panelists: they certainly
aren't afraid to speak their minds. I thank you both for your insight and the
provocative discussion.
